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What role did engineering and logistics play in BEF operational development 1916-1918?

The failure to understand and accept the operational pre-eminence of engineering and logistics was slowly rectified during 1918, beginning with the first Engineers Conferences in January 1918.[1]

Administratively, the British situation in the early part of the war was at best ‘ad-hoc’ and needed much improvement. The size of the force and scale of the warfare, required a rapid learning curve in terms of the supply and demand of all materiel and manpower. The liaison of Engineering, Technology and Logistical support were paramount to Allied victory in 1918. From 1916, and particularly from lessons learned from the battles of the Somme, the relationship of engineering and logistics and the role they would play for the remainder of the war would be decisive. The evolution of the BEF in terms of Field Engineering, Transportation, the Supply Chain and its continued re-organization would not have been possible without concise logistical and administrative procedure. The role of both the inseparable engineering and logistics served to increasingly improve operational strategy from British pre-war conceptions to a new and swift decision making process in 1917, but even more so in 1918. The definition of ‘Logistics’ has been eloquently described as ‘Everything bar the shouting’. [2] Indeed, the term Logistics implies the methods of providing all materiel and all means of carrying-out the process of war.  The success or failure of the war should really be assessed on the efforts and achievements of its organization. Often referred to as ‘the Engineers War’, it must certainly be considered that ingenuity, design and highly skilled labour paved the way to a successful outcome but without administration, the understanding of the logistical requirement, and without the supply of appropriately skilled and trained men and materiel, engineers would not have been successful. It is impossible to divorce engineering and logistics.

Few people suspected at the start of the First World War that it was ever going to proceed beyond a few months in duration. It was quickly realised, particularly with the demise of the bulk of Britain’s army some weeks later, that it was going to take more than patriotism and a basic military capability to pursue the conflict further. Historians tend only to consider the command, control and communication aspects of the war in which to offer explanation and understanding, with what might be considered as routine administrative matters, being largely left un-touched. Administrative matters affect the morale, logistics and resources of an army, and it is to this that emphasis should be equally directed.  Failure in any aspect of C3I or issues of morale and supply can lead to difficulty or even defeat on the battlefield. 

The usual image of administration is paperwork, and without doubt bureaucratic principles were held in abundance, but here administration refers specifically to the planning and implementation of workable activity. Supplies of men and materiel to the theatre of war were significant issues. Staffing, supplies, the use of sea ports and transportation amongst other things, required accurate and effective logistical planning.

 The logistical problems in the opening two years of the war provided a steep learning curve for the BEF. The rapid use of available ammunition and other supplies, the desperate need for clothes for harsh winters and other much publicised shortcomings and so on, implied that GHQ (Apart from training exercises, GHQ didn’t really come into existence until August 1914) were inefficient and had got it all wrong. Whilst the system did work in an ad-hoc basis and could be argued stifled the progress of innovation in some directions, it could not be said that the system did not work at all. Soldiers were transported, horses were fed, each field of interest, be it medical or post office, were efficiently covered from the beginning.

Commencing on a small scale with limited resources the war became more intense and more mobile. The need for more men, more equipment, more guns, more supplies and from 1916 more Tanks and other weapons required fresh design and a more elaborate means of distribution and supply. Britain’s effort to send a contemptible little army to fight in a continental conflict was considered sufficient by some in 1914 and understood by others to be the most well equipped and trained army Britain had ever sent to war, but it did not adequately prepare officers for the administrative expectations that the Great War would demand.  Historically, this might be partially blamed on the pre-war Victorian values of the staff college. 

There was little provision for expansion but if major operations such as the Somme, Third Ypres, Cambrai and the host of battles for 1918 were ever to be contemplated, then the hitherto ad-hoc approach was more than likely going to fail them. It is without doubt that the shell crisis of 1915 and the near collapse of the transportation system in 1916, would have the crippling effect of such a denigrated system of organization. 

Increased and improved logistical efforts on the Home Front in munitions, manpower and other supplies during 1916 ensured a better flow of manpower and materiel, but the infrastructure of shipping and transportation started to show strain.  The manufacture of goods in quantity and delivery to a French port was commendable only if the receiving port authority had the means to unload and despatch it to its next point in the supply chain.  It perhaps becomes clear at this point that any lack of interest or complacency and poor administration can leave the commander and his soldier as ‘end user’, in something of a predicament.  

The planning and delivery of supply did improve greatly from 1916, but the French sea ports were receiving more items than they could comfortably handle. The vast amount of goods being supplied, essential for the expanding war of 1916-1918 and specifically ammunition, meant that the military was becoming increasingly dependent on an internal infrastructure that needed much reorganization and improvement. The French having learned considerably of the use of railways from the Franco Prussian war failed to realise the importance of having complete coordination of her transport system. Initially, the British War Office had arranged with its French counterpart that the French would control the entire rail network. 

The Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig spent a considerable amount of time on administration. There can be little doubt that he recognized the importance of good organization in both military and administrative elements. Some might argue that he spent too much time on the latter, but he knew that if the ‘front-end’ was right, he could use his labour and engineering forces to their best advantage. The Field Service Regulations Part II demanded that administrative and command duties were basically kept separate and as a result there was little interaction between operations and administrative officers.  The Commander-in-Chief would have responsibility for military operations, but this would not extend to the supply requirements of his army. Haig might have recognized this as a flaw in the military system. Ad hoc arrangements during the first two years of war might have been classed as adequate, but in 1916 it was undoubtedly viewed as a crisis.

Once manpower, supplies and materiel were delivered, the ‘society’ of military personnel could maintain and build the requirements for future operations. Haig recognized during 1916 that the situation had outstretched the capability. During that year, the B.E.F. had been reinforced by seventeen divisions and the number of guns doubled from January to July and doubled again by November.  Haig must have been critically aware that during the Somme offensive, having insufficient quantities of ammunition and acute transportation issues, would not turn the ‘British’ war from its hitherto ‘defensive’ mode into an ‘offensive’ one that would achieve the eventual breakthrough. Transportation, albeit a single link in the supply chain was important enough to cause great difficulties and possibly even failure. The shortage of rail trucks, drivers, coal and teams to maintain track etc was acute. More and more ships arrived at Ports that were unable to unload, urgent stores could not move. The problem was by no means applicable only to the British. The French had failed to realise increased capacity but the British had succumbed to faulty organisation.  

Sir Eric Geddes, a civilian from the North Eastern Railway, was brought onto the scene. David Lloyd George impressed by Geddes business achievements was quick to recommend him for the job. Initially, Haig must have been desperate to turn to anyone, civilian or otherwise if they could offer assistance.  He was initially wary of employing a civilian, but came to realise that Geddes in a comparatively short timescale revolutionized virtually the entire transportation system to the common good. In May 1917 when Geddes was transferred to do a similar function with the Admiralty, Haig insisted that he remained on the books of the military as consultant.

Historically, the employment of civilians into the military world had not been successful, and Geddes experienced severe resistance from the various military factions. Geddes basically set himself up with an abundance of staff really more than would normally have been required. His argument being that with double the staff, he could expect a 30 per cent increased output.  He set about linking up ports to railways, railways to roads and inland waterways to both.

For a war on the continent, the British railway troops consisted of two companies of Royal engineers specially trained in railway construction and operation. Under its leader there were six deputy directors, twenty four transport officers, forty clerks and a construction railway company of six officers and two hundred and forty six other ranks.  The French system upon mobilization would see the control of railways under the military authorities.

There was little experience in dealing with the French railway organization. Companies of the Royal Engineers had long been specially trained as railway units but in discussions with the French, it was realised that the two systems were different and that the French method would need to be adopted. According to the Official History, British trains were of medium weight and operated at fairly high speeds. The French ran very heavy trains but at slow speed. Henniker cites an example that in England, an infantry battalion carried in two trains would be scheduled to run at 25 miles per hour. In France there would be one train at 12 miles per hour. Similarly, trains would carry one supply of rations or ammunition direct from stores or arsenals. The requirement was to get as many different supplies to a railhead at the same time. It was soon apparent that a swift learning curve was required.

Essentially the line of communication was affected by its transportation system. Not forgetting also, the increasing casualty rates with the wounded needing to be transported back to ‘safe’ Field Hospitals made the railway an essential component from that aspect alone. With many areas having an embodied single track system, a two-way process was relatively unmanageable. 

Geddes reviewed the railway situation. At the Army Commanders conference in November 1916 he mentioned the shortage of steel, requesting 500,000 tons.  There was 20,000 tons available. He had already placed orders for 1,000 miles of 60cm track expected by mid 1917. Arrangements were in hand to obtain 600 miles of 1,400 of broad gauge track by tearing up existing track in England Ireland and Canada. The shortage of broad gauge wagons would be resolved by making wooden framed items in England and shipping them to France. All but one of Geddes directorates was in operation by 1st January 1917  Field service Regulations 1913, stated that supplies would now be collected and delivered to the refilling points from the railhead by motor lorries and then by horse transport to the various units. 

The provision of stone for road repair also became a serious factor. The increased use of road transport due to lack of railway facilities was thus responsible for an increased use of railways; it therefore partially defeated its own object of relieving railways.

In May 1917 Geddes was succeeded by Sir Philip Nash who had been his deputy. Nash was from the Great Northern and East Indian Railway and took up his post until March 1918. Finally, for the war at least, an officer of the Royal Engineers, Major General Sydney Crookshank succeeded Nash until June 1918 when the organization was reversed and transportation was replaced under the QMG. Geddes sought to and succeeded in a total reorganization of the transportation of supply. A scheme his successors benefited from and subsequently enjoyed relatively unchanged until the end of the war.

Logistical organization provided the means for operations to be planned. The soldier provided the knowledge and skill for operations to be carried out. The soldier, who might have spent 10-15 days in a front line position might have spent the rest of his year working in an occupation in the traditional sense, and perhaps in one that he was used to and skilled in. This applied equally to Infantry, Pioneers, Engineers and others. The battlefield required the same functions and attention as any modern society with continual building, maintaining and repairing of its holdings. 

The Labour Corps, Pioneer Corps, the Infantry and other units usually under the direction of Royal Engineers carried out work that was not only entirely new to them but must have seemed difficult work. Building, repairing, road making and laying railways eventually made them experts in their field. The Pioneer’s too having assisted with crater defences, trench digging, redoubts, installation of gas and the driving of shafts and tunnel dugouts. 

1917 saw the maturing of the military operational system. The two areas of control on the Western Front rested on strategic and operational principles. Kitchener’s new army battalions, increasingly unlimited ammunition supplies and rotation of formations allowed the army to proceed operationally to the levels that the Commander in chief might have perceived. Indeed, Tim Travers notes in The Killing Ground that Haig had written to Lady Haig indicating that he ‘had fixed everything up for the subordinate commanders’  By this he meant that the job of battle planning and ‘tactics’ were the domain of the lower ranks. Travers notes also that GHQ was similarly detached from this process. The gap of logistical planning and delivery was closing.  

Faulty design or planning or not anticipating the enemy caused many losses to personnel and to weaponry. The Somme battles, with high hopes failed to make the breakthrough and had very high casualties. The battles of Third Ypres ended similarly with high loss. The battle of Cambrai in late 1917 ended not as it had started but in a failure due to not exploiting the gains. In March 1918, the British caught by surprise, partly due to poor intelligence reports had to forfeit virtually forty miles of ground. Wherever the fault might lie in these situations, the army in the field was largely equipped to do the job. The later months of 1918 proved this and certainly in the remaining hundred day’s offensives, poor organization, poor supply and a lack of skilled labour would not have allowed the Allies to proceed to victory the way they did.

Thuillier suggests in his paper that engineering works in a theatre of war, fall into two main classes: the first in field engineering, which is linked to tactical operations and is carried out by the troops including engineering units under the commanders of fighting formations, and secondly works services which includes all engineering work of a general nature not having an immediate bearing on tactical operations, such as those at bases and lines of communication. 

Field engineering demands that stores and equipment are available and arranges for deliveries to the sites where required. Field Engineering does not stand alone. Often an activity is achieved as a combined activity. The building of a bridge for example might be constructed by an infantry battalion under the direction of engineers. This wasn’t always the case, and in the early part of the war the Infantry requested the engineers to dig their trenches for them, but it became apparent very quickly that there were insufficient engineers to complete these tasks. 

Infantry commanders were untrained in the art of engineering work so it became customary to have a few engineers with an attached infantry unit to complete a task. Infantry still grumbled, and failed to come to terms with this approach even if the life of the infantryman was at stake. Infantry battalion’s providing labour attachments to the Royal Engineer’s was naturally disastrous for the infantry establishment. It not only upset the organization of their units but rendered men exhausted in having to complete warfare tasks also. This does not appear to have been a lesson learned by the British during the war. The Canadians and Australians by comparison did eventually take heed and successfully attached more engineers to each battalion. The successes of the Canadian victories of 1918 were directly attributed to the principle of engineers doing engineers work and letting the infantry continue with what they were trained to do. 

Engineering units had now become organized and accountable by the army and were no longer in the ‘stand-alone’ position that both the engineering and artillery had historically enjoyed. The range of tasks for engineers was wide. The building of bridges, the assurance of a water supply to all military personnel, communications and signals, the digging of tunnels, trenches, virtually anything that any offensive operation might require would all be part of the engineers remit. 

In 1917, the Fourth Army during the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line, had to deal with bridging on a wide scale. Every available bridge had been destroyed by the enemy. The principle in bridging an obstacle such as the river Somme was that bridges for infantry and perhaps pack animals should be thrown first; that these should be followed by pontoon or trestle bridges to take regimental transport and field artillery, and that finally heavy bridges should be made for the movement of artillery or heavy transport. 

The Royal Engineers Base Park was responsible for the delivery of steel bridges to railheads at 72 hours notice. As a result of a conference of the Chief Engineers it was decided to put a corps chief engineer in charge of bridging material, and that an army troops company should be in charge of bridge erection. Estimates of requirements would be prepared and transport to railhead arranged. The German retreat to the Hindenburg line had on this occasion already begun before the changes could be implemented.

Not without problems, any bridging that was required was not always completed without snags of some kind. Tree trunks might have to be sawn through or some other time consuming obstacle that would make onward movement very slow. Some remarkable achievements were made. The official history refers to a requirement of six gaps that needed to be bridged along the Amiens to St Quentin road at Brie. The canal and canal flood water channel as well as the river itself had to be bridged overnight with the light of bonfires. The engineers completed the crossing for horse transport by 5am.  Ingenuity also played its part with the use of bricks from enemy destroyed property to provide suitable roadways. Such activity improved the army’s ability to become mobile.  The crossing of rivers had a basic set of rules. Unless the fighting was mobile, rivers didn’t need to be crossed. On the Western front, the problem included canals which posed a different problem. Canals usually have steep sides and depth and width and are generally fairly uniform. Infantry and cavalry can easily cross a river, but cavalry cannot cross canals and in any event tanks couldn’t cross any patch of water without a bridge.

Artillery had often devastated land so much that roads, railways etc., had to be rebuilt or in some cases left altogether. Mud at Passchendaele is legendary, but equally in the later months of the Somme battles, mud and poor weather conditions created fundamental problems to any further offensive or movement. As troop advances increased, road and rail requirements increased. The pressure on supply, logistics and engineering increased and therefore acted to prolong completion. In Mud, Blood and Wood,  Rob Thomson suggests from comments noted at the time, that logistics, engineering, manpower and administrative preparation and practice were more likely candidates for the failure of Third Ypres rather than the mud itself. Had the weather been more favourable the existing system may well have proved successful. It is also suggested that given the mud and rain, better administration and practice would have helped overcome the issues. 

Trench fortifications were an art too, and various reference manuals were published on how to build and maintain them to particular standards.  Provision of duck board’s for trenches was a particular problem, some of the trails being several miles long. Similarly, getting supplies along trench lines was difficult as heavy usage by light railway schemes or continual troop movements created even more mud. Drastic measures to improve such situations were taken. 

By contrast, preparation and supply for Cambrai worked well. In addition, the movement of men and materiel and particularly tanks was completed under the utmost secrecy. It is well documented that the initial stages of the battle were met with success for the British troops and without doubt, the role that logistics and engineering played was paramount to that success. It was battlefield tactics that lost the initiative in later days rather than supply. The movement of war weary units from the Ypres sector to the line at Cambrai and the removal of a British army contingent to Italy were unfortunate, but the well equipped army that remained had been adequately prepared and supplied. The Cambrai sector had become a resting place for German troops transferred from Ypres.  The German commanders thought that the strong Hindenburg line would support the Germans in any bombardment and attack. The difficulty for the British was how to place manpower into position and even more so almost 400 tanks without arousing suspicion with the Germans. Mostly, the organization took place by night. On November 20th 1917, the tanks were moved into position and without a preliminary shot being fired the attack commenced with the main bombardment. The presence of smoke, gas shell, Lewis guns and trench mortars and the successes of piercing the German lines, by 7000 yards in some cases were phenomenal. It displayed the overall factors of preparation, supply, intelligence, tactics, technology and engineering as a driving force in a successful opening phase of the attack. 

The later years of the war demonstrated how mobility had changed the tactics. Motor transport had significantly supported the age old use of horses and the fact that the movement of personnel could be completed by road or rail more effectively, changed the way the operations were perceived. For all their design and mechanical faults, the use of Mark 1 tanks on the Somme to the Mark IV tanks at Cambrai indicated that technology was entirely changing the course of events. 

Technology was not always effectively used. Sir Henry Rawlinson used tanks on the Somme and appreciated though underestimated the potential of them. Equally, he underestimated their limitations, but this is more akin to bad planning or inexperience rather than to logistical or engineering skills. The October battles at Third Ypres showed how the weather could affect the outcome of an attack irrespective of the planning or use of weapons and supply. The trick was to revisit the planning tactics.

The ‘all bar the shouting’ philosophy of logistics is on the whole correct when assessing how men and materiel might meet the challenge of warfare, but the combined use of increasingly improving engineering skills of all regiments and those of specific engineering battalions as well as the planning and logistical events of the supply chain was the tool that would eventually defeat the foe in 1918. Manpower problems, shortage of, or right calibre of, were more akin to political problems of the likes of David Lloyd George or Douglas Haig, but the basic core of ‘operations’ remained the domain of engineering and logistics.  

The British army had changed from being a small force to a contemptible strength of five armies with a million or more men in the field at any one time. In 1915, the British had limited weapons and firepower which were insufficient but for the smallest of skirmishes. It was only in 1916, that Lewis guns, grenades and the advent of tanks that firepower enabled the war to leave its defensive stance and move towards the offensive. Without doubt the horrific battles of 1917 were heavy in casualties, and conditions largely prevented many possible successes. In 1918, Douglas Haig tended to listen more attentively to his subordinate commanders and without doubt, firepower in 1918 was beginning to overtake manpower. Haig realised the significance of utilising his manpower more effectively, and with a greater abundance of stocks of ammunition came to realise that ‘the act had been drawn together’ and believed that in 1918, the war could be won. In the development of operations, engineering and logistics were essential parts of the whole.    

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brown I.M. British Logistics on the Western Front (1998) 

Falls Capt Cyril Official History 1917 Vol 1 Pg130

Henniker: A M Official History Transportation on the Western Front Transport (orig. published 1937. This reprint 2001) 

Jet RUSI 

Journal 75 A Pioneer battalion in the Great war  (1930) Pg 120

Miles Capt W. Official History 1916Vol 2 Pg 548

Prior and Wilson Command on the Western Front  The Military career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914-1918 (1992) Pg 229.

Taylor Col. M.G.  Land Transportation in the Great War  1921 pg 705

Thompson R. Mud, Blood and Wood : BEF Operational and Combat Logistico-Engineering during the Third Battle of Ypres, 1917 in M.Bennett & P Doyle (eds) Fields of Battle(2002) pp.237-55 

 ThompsonR. Presentation Notes (Title)21.06.08  Birmingham  

Thuillier Maj-Gen H.F  Engineers and the Army (1925)

Travers T  The Killing Ground (1987) Pg 142 

British Trench Warfare : A Reference Manual General Staff War Office 

(Reprint) Date not available (c. 2005)