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‘In every respect the Expeditionary Force of 1914 was incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British Army which ever went forth to war’.[1]

In deciding whether ‘Britain’ was prepared for war or in a state of readiness for war is not entirely dependent on military machinations but involves the understanding of both military and political affairs, both domestic and foreign and includes all associated activities on the Home Front. Britain had enjoyed its Pax Britannica, and whilst having believed it had been in relative peace for virtually one hundred years, had in fact experienced many smaller wars and skirmishes throughout that period. In the two decades preceding the war, much debate and many changes of tactics and ideas had taken place on all approaches to Britain’s security. The mindset of the control and culture of the British Empire at that time was that Great Britain would always win any war victoriously as it usually had done in previous conflicts. Pre-1914, nobody could have prepared themselves for many of the battles that ensued during the war. The growth of armaments and the understanding of the European political situation in the preceding war years, meant that the commencement of any hostilities, albeit with a degree of reluctance on the British part, would be entered into with the appropriate attitude and temperament. For as much as that determines readiness, then Britain entered the war confidently.

Political events in the summer of 1914 had been pre-occupied with the Irish Home Rule issue. The ever threatening situation in Europe was only just starting to attract serious and focused attention. The fear of German expansionism, or hostility, had been there for many years but events on the continent were now beginning to develop a more sinister format. As late as 24 July 1914, an afternoon Cabinet meeting in Downing Street held by the then Prime Minister Herbert Asquith had been discussing the Irish issues. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary later joined the meeting and made a statement about the European situation which later diverted and held the real interest of the session. Austria had sent an ultimatum to Serbia that she knew would not be met and demanded an answer within 48 hours. This would mean that Russia would stand in defence of Serbia, and therefore, Germany and France would also have to show an allegiance to one side or the other. Britain at this point believed that Austria was probably prepared to ignore any capitulation that Serbia might make and that hostilities would become inevitable. Asquith believed that it was the ‘most dangerous situation of the last forty years’.[2] (Grey had been accused of paying little attention to the Sarajevo crisis prior to the ultimatum and his overall input has been seen by many historians as incompetent and negative[3] Winston Churchill wrote that the International crisis was hardly noticed before the 24 July. David Lloyd George had written similarly in his memoirs that it was incompetence in men like Grey that allowed Europe to slide into war. This has proved to be misleading. It is true that until the last moment he believed that Germany would restrain Austria, but he had already put the prepared policy for war into action).[4]

Intervention in any hostile act became the leading concern for many parties. The ‘City’, amidst its continual financial doom and gloom was totally against intervention. Even Asquith, though not hopeful, saw possibilities of Britain standing aside. It appeared that it would all hinge upon the issue of Belgium’s neutrality. This was a consideration that Grey mentioned in his Parliamentary speech of Britain’s obligations under The London Treaty of 1839.[5] Politicians such as David Lloyd George were at this point leaving their options open on how things could be moved forward, whilst Winston Churchill, quite characteristically, was anxious to mobilize. By 2 August Germany was at war with both Russia and France and had violated the neutrality of Luxembourg. Asquith told the emotional and concerned German Ambassador Lichnowsky, that Britain had no desire to intervene. The Cabinet as expected was split. Generally, the view was to steer clear of any intervention. After much debate, there was agreement on allowing the British fleet to prevent any German fleet from using the English Channel as a base of hostile operations. Asquith was clear in his mind of his position.[6]

Great Britain clearly wished to avoid conflict, but the events in Europe and the vociferous requests for assistance from France reduced the likelihood of British non-intervention. The speech given by Grey in Parliament was well received on 3 August and the decision for Britain to advise Germany by telegram requesting assurances about Belgium made these final hours a certainty that Britain was reluctantly heading inexorably into war in Europe.

Once the decisions had been made the machinery to deploy available forces was swift. Pre-war preparations and organization proved successful.

In the years prior to 1914, Great Britain had been very much aware of the need to prepare for such an event as a continental war. The root causes of the war lay in the preceding decades of British and European politics and the balance of power. The assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand in Serbia whilst shocking the major powers merely acted as the catalyst that mobilized events. 

The diplomatic background of the war in 1914 really asserts itself from the aftermath of the 1870-1871 Franco Prussian War. The recovery of Alsace-Lorraine was surely the most powerful force behind France not only seeking revenge but ensuring that Europe would maintain a state of readiness for some kind of future conflict. Napoleon III had declared war on Germany in 1870 with precious little preparedness for war.[7] As France perceived themselves to be a much more powerful state than Prussia, an easy victory was expected. Barnes suggests that public opinion in both Britain and the United States was on the side of Prussia and the French rightly had to face the consequences of their folly.

The greater part of Alsace/Lorraine had originally been German territory taken by the French, and in 1870 Germany decided to reclaim what they thought was theirs. The Franco-Prussian relationship was never going to go beyond stalemate. This led to a dangerous situation for Europe and a threat to future peace.

It might be prudent at this point to consider the belief that Germany was spending huge sums of money on its re-armament programme, more than it had ever done before; an action it initiated to preserve peace and provide a suitable defence for its country. The German population in the years up to 1914 was almost double that of France, but the French army was slightly larger than the German and in theory at least, more prepared. Probably nearer the mark is that any increase in armaments to preserve peace engendered fear and suspicion among the population, but defence spending despite any British or European view is quickly put into perspective when we consider the facts.[8] Barnes argued that the German navy was never any real challenge to the naval supremacy of Great Britain.

The unprecedented expenditure by the main players of Europe didn’t detract the British from the view that peace could be reasoned through negotiation. Edward Grey’s speech outlined the position of the British Government. The policy of peace had failed. He gave three factors of British intention. Firstly, that if any crisis arose, the leaders would bring the matter before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be. Secondly, that there would be no secret engagement to spring upon the House, and thirdly, that the House should not be told that because we entered upon that engagement there was an obligation of honour on the country.[9] His comments were well received.  One main emphasis from his announcement appears to have re-iterated the British view that any crisis could be dealt with diplomatically. Grey supported this view with reference to the Balkan crisis of 1908 which originated in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The philosophy was to promise nothing more than diplomatic support. In the decade up to 3 August 1914 this had remained the case. 

Grey’s later references emphasized that, with the French Fleet in the Mediterranean, Britain could not, from close proximity watch any German aggressor undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping. Authorization had been given to mobilize British sea Forces if that was to be the case. The neutrality of Belgium protected by the Treaty of 1839 obliged Great Britain to defend Belgian interests. Prince Bismarck over the issues of 1870 remained superfluous in reference to the Treaty. At the closing of his speech, Grey stated that with all things considered, the forces of the Crown were ready.[10] 

Winston Churchill in a speech in the House of Commons barely six months after war commenced, confirmed that on the Declaration of War, Britain was able to count upon a Fleet of sufficient superiority for all of British needs. They had a good margin of safety in vital matters, supplied and equipped with every requirement that could be foreseen, with reserves of ammunition and torpedoes and ample supplies of fuel and food. Numbers of men and training facilities for new projects and the replacement of casualties were equally sufficient.[11]

The optimism and confidence of politicians in this regard does not always appear to have been the case. In Viscount Haldane’s Before the War he stated that Germany was more likely to attack France than Britain.[12] The French having similar fear were keen to draw British attention to the international situation. As early as 1906 they discussed with Edward Grey that if such an attack was to be made on France, would Britain have enough at stake so as to make her willing to join in resisting it. They went on to ask whether Britain could mobilize a fully trained army of say, 100,000 men to protect the French frontier of Belgium should the Germans seek to enter France that way.[13] Sir Edward Grey consulted the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Haldane was instructed in January 1906 to consider the points made.

Haldane entered the War Office with a willing and open mind, unlike some of his predecessors who had preconceived ideas and minds made up.[14] He suggested that the South African War had disclosed weakness and inefficiency and much change was required in the army organization. He picked his team who seemingly complemented his ideas and methods, and it appears none more so than Douglas Haig. Haig, whilst hitherto unknown to him, had come with good recommendation. Haldane relied heavily on Haig to translate his ideas into workable form. Without him it seems, Haldane would have struggled for the success that he actually achieved.[15]  According to Blake, two principal tasks confronted Haldane and Haig. One was to organize an Expeditionary Force to confront a European war. The second was the reconstruction of the volunteer force.  Work completed by Haig was impressive and considered very successful. Haldane was determined to make reforms to the army function, the first since the Cardwell reforms of the 1870’s,[16]

The General Staff was organized in September 1906. Haldane could claim to have not only achieved 100,000 men but 160,000 men that could, with the help of the Navy, be transported within 12 days to a place of concentration decided by the appropriate authorities of Britain or France. 

The British army did not possess the same armaments as Germany. “On one occasion the German troops were unable to believe that their enemies were not equipped with at least as many machine guns as themselves, such was the rapidity and accuracy of fire achieved by highly trained riflemen of the British Army”.[17] Britain’s ‘contemptible’ little army of 50,000 (the remainder guarding the outposts of Empire) were shipped off to France before the public had realized they were at war.[18]

By 1910, the details of the first-line army had been completed. The second-line was to be much larger and consist of a territorial army. Less trained but so designed that it could expand if required. It proposed to place the militia, yeomanry and volunteers together to form the Territorial force. It would be equipped with all the support elements including Medical and transport etc. in keeping with the regular army, but they were ultimately considered to be far less trained. The Territorial function was home defence but during the war great numbers gave service to several theatres abroad. Haldane refutes any allegation that Britain was not prepared. Unlike Germany and France, Britain saw no real purpose in Compulsory service in peace time. The argument that Britain would have had additional lines of defence as Germany and France did, do not appear to have been upheld. It was decided that the British public would not have tolerated such a policy. David Lloyd George in 1910 expressed that conscription was beyond the bounds of possibility. Even three years later a Parliamentary Bill on the subject faltered at its second reading. Besides, the relationship with Germany or anyone else in the preceding decade, whilst expected, was not actually at a critical point. Haldane’s work to reform the military and naval factions were undoubtedly successful. Gerard J DeGroot’s book, Blighty, British Society in the era of the Great War, took a more critical view of Haldane’s efforts. DeGroot believed that the situation between Britain and Germany had worsened in the preceding decade and it was this that prompted and focused the mind of Haldane. Additionally, DeGroot claimed that Haldane was committed to build his large and efficient army with a budget of £28 million. This he did, but against financial constraints rather than the real requirements of a continental strategy.[19]  Haldane recognized that it would have been advantageous in 1914 to have had a ‘great’ army fully trained for actions in Europe but suggested that it might have taken at least two generations to organize and prepare. DeGroot may be factually right, but his inference of Haldane producing an inadequate solution is unfair. The aim was to have a military strength of 34,000 each year, but even with increases of pay as sweeteners could only muster around 28,000. It seems the people too had different priorities.

Haldane was not only responsible on the Home Front but for the Empire as a whole. At the time, criticism was leveled at Government for providing an army of only 160,000 men in 1914 when it should have been two million men, which of course it later came to be. The Expeditionary Force of 1918 was indeed substantially different than the one that appeared in 1914, but Haldane argued that raising a much larger army by the stress of war and of a nation willing to participate in the action for a cause is one thing, but in peacetime quite another. The logistics of such an exercise would be prohibitive without additional funding and the recruiting of highly educated training staff, facilities and above all volunteers would have made the project unviable. Various groups made an entrance. The National Service League for instance, founded in 1902 aimed to learn from the mistakes made in the Boer War, whereby sixty per cent of volunteers were rejected as unfit. The pressure group was loaded with high ranking names in support with significant numbers of Members of Parliament from all parties to encourage conscription. Despite a general following, it achieved and succeeded in very little.

Great Britain’s perceived fear of Germany developing her naval policy was disconcerting to politicians. Britain’s policy throughout was as mentioned, always to negotiate for peace and avoid war if at all possible. Perhaps Britain was more concerned with Germany’s economic lead in Europe rather than the size of its Battle Fleet.  Either way, there is little doubt that Sir Edward Grey made every effort to resolve issues peacefully. Haldane points out though that German naval policy did cause British politicians ‘to sit down and take thought’.[20]

By comparison with allied armies, the British Expeditionary force was small. The view was that with France at one side and Russia at the other, there would be a good chance of defeating any aggression that Germany might offer. With the British Navy too having a hitherto unknown strength, which eventually took a decisive role in blockade activities, the outcome was bound to be positive. 

The Cardwell Reforms shaped the organization of the army to some degree in a way that the modern army of today still functions. But it still needed further change from the outset, and in the early 1900’s, and particularly in the aftermath of the Boer war, when for the first time, Britain had to send more men than ever before overseas, the time had become right to introduce formal change. The appearance of Haldane’s Committee of Imperial Defence in May 1904, was to become the centre of strategic planning.[21] The achievements of this administrative body would now stand proud in the responsibility of ensuring swift movement of the British Expeditionary Force to France in 1914. In earlier years the CID was largely to discuss points in dispute between departments. A.J. Balfour[22] in 1905 announced that the invasion of Britain was not an eventuality that needed to be seriously considered. Again in 1907 under the leadership of Herbert Asquith the same conclusion was reached. The emphasis was on the People’s Budget, the House of Lords, the National Insurance Act and the accession of George V.[23]   All interested parties insisted that the CID was an advisory body only. This caused some difficulties. Campbell-Bannerman showed little interest in the CID throughout his Premiership. He saw no need for military policy. Asquith too appears to have had only a peripheral interest in defence, generally allowing other ministers and departments to monitor and progress issues themselves.[24]   When the Agadir crisis occurred, Haldane demanded a meeting of the CID.[25] Mackintosh argues that Asquith was forced to debate issues on British Strategy for the first time, and notes that he resolved the issues in Cabinet and not in the CID.

Haldane called for changes to the Admiralty so as to be brought in line with army reforms. He saw the higher command of the admiralty as archaic and a peril to the public interest.[26] The Army had seen in 1904, the role of Commander-in-Chief abolished and replaced by the Army Council. In 1905 the constitution of the General Staff was set up. Many important changes were introduced into the Medical Services. Having learned lessons from the Boer and Russo-Japanese wars[27] administrative and training changes were made and the introduction of the Clearing Hospital[28] became one of the great features of Haldane’s new system.

The Regular Army became an Expeditionary Force consisting of six divisions of all arms and one cavalry division. Each division had 18,000 individuals and was organized into brigades and battalions. The Cavalry Division had 9,000 individuals and 10,000 horses. Divisions were given equal quantities of armaments for their size. The Militia was renamed Special Reserve; an arm for feeding the Regular Army with new soldiers. The Territorial force had an establishment of 300,000 organized in very much the same way as the Regular army. This figure dropped to a concerning level prior to 1914, but at the first sign of danger it remarkably rose to the required number.[29]  Training was paramount, and practice attacks and counter-attacks, regular mobilization and so on was continually practiced. Edmonds argues that recruitment was an issue in terms of recruits turning up at all times of the year, training instructors being withdrawn and a constant flow of soldiers postings to India created insurmountable disadvantages.[30] Haldane required similar re-organization for the Navy. His ‘War Book’ of 1911 with a chapter for each department ensured that everyone knew what they had to do and how they had to do it in the event of war. [31]

German naval improved supremacy continued unabated (though as discussed earlier on page 5, expenditure was similar to other major players). The year 1909 saw Germany’s efforts on the ‘big gun’ ships double those of Britain, and this was significant in the financial arrangements of the British Government in that year. Both David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill were more concerned with social reform and refuted the call for an increase from four to six Dreadnoughts. Herbert Asquith intervened and agreed four ships to be laid down immediately with a further four based on need. The eventual mistrust of German intentions, despite their promises later saw the British lay down all eight at once.[32]  This decision would severely upset the finances of that year. Also in 1909 the Field Service Regulations had been updated and issued. Significantly, Douglas Haig had spent much time in completing this work. Gerard DeGroot argues that the building of Dreadnoughts was really a flaw in the British mentality. These ships were built on the premise that naval encounters would be massed forces in a set-piece battle and therefore enable a short war. There is also the belief that much of other the European armies were blessed with the same outlook. The ‘big but short’ battles envisaged were unlikely, and consequently, the requirement of big ships was an unnecessary expenditure and effort. In a long war, he suggests, there was a naval role of blockade and of keeping shipping lanes open, to transport troops and to protect merchant shipping. The fervent view of the British public to compete with German naval expansionism overlooked the building of other items such Submarines which would provide new unknown challenges for Britain and be much more useful in a longer war.[33] Much of this is difficult to argue with, but it is with hindsight that this logic triumphs. Britain and other European States genuinely thought that any war would be swift and likely to be short. As mentioned, it was believed up until the last moments that war could be averted. The public belief appears to have been that ‘it would all be over by Christmas’ anyway.

The naval view was that the English Channel might be relatively straightforward to defend, but the vast expanse of the North Sea and also the northern islands of Britain lay dangerously vulnerable to attack. The Grand Fleet which was to take the northern position had to be in a state of readiness for war at all times and any requirement would be instantaneous. All ships would have to be in full commission. It was viewed that numbers of officers and ratings were insufficient, and as the French had done similarly, Britain would have to reduce commerce protection cruisers to support the Grand Fleet. Transportation of Troops by sea had also long been on the navy agenda, and despite earlier problems on how it might be done, the true extent of eventual numbers was never contemplated at that time.[34]

As war started in August 1914, the year had still virtually four months to go. Any idea of being unprepared at the start was surely to be eliminated before the end of the year. The recruiting campaigns of Lord Kitchener are legendary. His call for an additional 100,000 men had been achieved by 25 August. As men were the first necessity, the realization of readiness was changing into the scale of the war to be. Kitchener announced at this point that the War Office was aiming at thirty divisions continually maintained in the field. This would represent around 650,000 men. Even this figure of course was not considered to be final. Shifting situations demanded quick re-thinking. Such unprecedented numbers required training and equipping. A shortage of rifles and ammunition would be a natural consequence. It is crucial to consider that Sir John French in June and July 1914 formulated his future demands in terms of an increasing force under his command.[35]  

In addition, the support from the Dominions was unprecedented. Virtually from the opening of war in 1914, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and even India offered immediate support. The German General Staff expected little from the British Dominions. It is not difficult to see why. For example, Canada had a small contingent of 3000 with no system of reserves. Its active Militia had 75000 registered individuals, and its purpose was not taken seriously by its people.[36]  Once it had offered support, it became a fighting force with much input and influence throughout the war. On 3 August, the day before war was declared, the Australian Cabinet met and decided to offer Britain the full use of the naval forces but also a contingent of 20000 as an expeditionary force.[37] New Zealand too offered in proportion to population more than any other within the Empire. South Africa recognized her obligations and over the entire war offered 136,000 troops.

The logistics of the supply and organization for 1914 of men, materials, services and support was completed by the reforms and the painful lessons of other wars over several decades. Railway systems during the Boer War were of particular significance in this respect. The Germans had realized the importance of a railway administration as early as the war in 1866, and by 1870 had perfected a well organized system. The French had not, and learned to their cost. The British had considered mobilization for both Home and overseas defence and detailed plans were in progress. Even two years before the war in 1914, the British Railways Board on the instruction of the War Office, were practicing many mobilization procedures using several railway stations around the eastern counties of England.  Manoeuvres dealing with the supply of food, stores, petrol, water etc., as well as men and horses were received at railheads and loaded and unloaded in accordance with well directed schemes of operation.[38]

The political decision making in whether Britain was ready for war does lie heavily against financial constraints. Britain as a society had long expected hostilities with Germany. There had been much talk of war prior to 1914 and even in London’s West End as early as 1910 there were enterprising theatrics about it. The road to readiness for the Government was clearly not an easy one, but the national strategy did appear. It was not realized that the war was to be a long one as the likes of Haig and Kitchener had prophesized, but Britain had to change its strategy. It was having the ability to change its direction, which it did, that made the designs of the original strategies successful. It hadn’t envisaged the issues that the war would eventually demand, and the war in 1918 was certainly different than the one it started with in 1914, but readiness and preparedness for war in 1914 was as close as it perhaps could ever have been.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asquith,  The Earl of Oxford and           Memories and Reflections Vol 2

Barnes, Harry Elmer                                                       Genesis of the World War 1970 Reprint

Blake  Robert                                                        The Private papers of Douglas Haig , 1914-1919

Bradford J.F.                                                       Railway Notes on the Manoeuvres in the eastern Counties   Autumn 1912

Churchill Winston S.                                 Great Speeches of the War (1915)

Corbett, Sir Julian S.                                  Naval Operations History of the Great War based on Official           Documents     (1938)                 

Cowie, Donald                                                An Empire Prepared (1^st Ed.1939)

Degroot, Gerard J                                              Blighty, British Society in the era of the Great War (1^st Ed. 1996)

Eckstein,  Michael                                            Some notes on Sir Edward Grey’s policy in July 1914 from The Historical     Journal xv, (1972)

Edmonds,  Brigadier-General J.E.                         Military Operations France and Belgium 1914 Vol. 1 (1933)

Ensor, R.C.K.                                                England 1870-1914 (1968) Reprint

Grey, Sir Edward                                               Great speeches of the War  (1915)                                                                 

Haldane, Viscount                           Before the War (1920) Internet copy

Hamilton, Lord Earnest                                     The First Seven Divisions 14^th Edition (1916)

Hammerton Sir J.A.                                      A Popular History of the Great War. 

History of the Ministry of Munitions        Volume 1  Industrial Mobilisation 1914-1915(1922)

Mackintosh, John P.                                             The role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914                                               (1962)

Sommer, Dudley                                            Haldane of Cloan.  His Life and Times 1856-1928  (1960)

[1] Brigadier-General J.E. Edmonds Military Operations France and Belgium 1914 Vol. 1 Page 10

[2] The Earl of Oxford and Asquith Memories and Reflections Vol 2 Pages 5-6

[3] Michael Eckstein Some notes on Sir Edward Grey’s policy in July 1914 from The Historical Journal xv, (1972) p.321

[4] Michael Eckstein Some notes on Sir Edward Grey’s Policy in July 1914. The Historical journal xv (1972) p. 321-324

[5] Sir J.A. Hammerton  A Popular History of the Great War.  The Treaty of London was signed on 19 April 1839 in London between Britain, France, Prussia, Russia and Austria. In article one of the treaty, the five powers agreed the neutrality of Belgium.

[6] The Earl of Oxford and Asquith Memories and Reflections Vol 2 Page 9

Quote: happily I am quite clear in my mind as to what is right and wrong.

1)     We have no obligation of any kind either to France or Russia to give them military or naval help.

2)     The dispatch of the Expeditionary Force to help France at this moment is out of the question and would serve no object.

3)     We must not forget the ties created by our long standing and intimate friendship with France

4)     It is against British interests that France should be wiped out as a Great Power.

5)     We cannot allow Germany to use the channel as a hostile base.

6)     We have obligations to Belgium to prevent it being utilized and absorbed by Germany.

[7] Harry Elmer Barnes Genesis of the World War 1970 Reprint Page76

‘Writing in the Saturday Evening Post  24 October 1914 Clemenceau frankly admitted that :  ‘In 1870 Napoleon III in a moment of folly, declared war on Germany without even having the the excuse of military preparedness. No true Frenchman has ever hesitated to admit that the wrongs of that day were committed by our side. Dearly have we paid for them’.

[8] Ibid, p.56 (see footnote p.6)

Expenditure for arms from 1905-1914

Russia………………£495,144.622

France………………£347,348,259

Germany……………£448,025,543

Austria………………£234,668,407

Naval Expenditures from 1904-1914 Page 59

France………………£161,721,387

Russia………………£144,246,513

Germany……………£185,205,164

Austria………………£50,692,814

During the same period the British naval expenditure was £351,916,576

[9] Sir Edward Grey Great speeches of the War  1915 p.3

[10] Ibid. p.15

Grey stated:  ‘I believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the Navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores.

[11] Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill Great Speeches of the War 1915 p.104

[12] Gereard J DeGroot suggests in his book British Society in the era of the Great War that Haldane’s Before the War (1920) was a postwar autobiography ‘to defend himself against charges levelled by the right wing press during the war, that he had failed to prepare Britain for war on the continent’. P. 24

[13] Viscount Haldane Before the War 1920 Internet copy

[14] Dudley Sommer Haldane of Cloan His Life and Times 1856-1928  1960 p.166-167

[15] Editor Robert Blake The Private papers of Douglas Haig , 1914-1919 p. 21

[16] Edward Cardwell was British War Minister from 1868-1874 and is considered to be the greatest War Minster during the nineteenth century. His army reforms appeared in 1871. The most highly debated point of the Bill was the abolition of ‘purchase’. People could no longer buy their way into privileged army positions. There was much opposition, but he achieved his aim by Royal Warrant.  Sommer. Haldane of Cloan 1960 p.22

[17] Ibid p.22

[18] Lord Ernest Hamilton. The First Seven Divisions 14^th Edition 1916 p. 8

[19] Gerard J DeGroot British Society in the Era of the Great War  1996  p.24

[20] Viscount Haldane Before the War 1920 Internet copy

He refers to eight specific points to explain and justify Britain’s pre-war position. (Quoted)

1.                 It was necessary, if the safety of England was not to be put in jeopardy that she should enter into real and close friendships with other nations.

2.                 The great attraction to these other nations would lie in the maintenance of British sea-power.

3.                 While the power of the British Navy was of the first importance to France, she might also, through no fault of her own, be placed in such peril as it made desirable that we should be able to render her help by land also.             

4.                 But the military forces of France and her ally, Russia, were great enough to make it reasonable to estimate that a small army from England would be a sufficient addition to enable France to break the shock of an aggressive attack on her.

5.                 Even on purely military grounds it was impossible for Great Britain to raise in time of peace a great army for use on the continent. The necessity of recruiting and educating the necessary corps of professional officers required to train and command such an army would have occupied at least two generations if the task were to be taken in hand in peace time. But it was possible to organize and prepare a small but highly trained Expeditionary Force, provided we discarded some of our old military traditions, and studied modern requirements and objectives in consultation with those who were best able to throw light on them.

6.                 Although more than modern and scientific organization on a comparatively small scale was not in our power, we could in carrying out even this much lay foundations which would enable expansion in time of war to take place.

7.                 In the result, as was believed here, and as Admiral von Tirpitz himself seems to have anticipated, sea power and capacity for blockade would decide the issue of the war. In this respect Germany seemed less well prepared than Great Britain.

8.               The last thing wished for was war, and if we had to enter upon it we should do so only in defence of our own vital interests, as well as those of the other Entente Powers, Our entry, if it was to come, must be immediate and unhesitating. For if we delayed Germany might succeed in occupying the northern coast of France, and in impairing our security by sea.

[21] The C.I.D. actually had its roots much earlier. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet was created in 1895.

[22] A.J. Balfour. British Prime Minister in 1905 succeeded by Campbell-Bannerman in December 1905.

[23] John P. Mackintosh The role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914 (1962) p.495

[24] Ibid. p.497

[25] Ibid. p.498  The Agadir crisis was based around Germany accusing the French of trying to take over Morocco and keeping it as part of the French Empire. Germany sent a gunboat the Panther to Agadir. This immediately aroused the suspicions of the French and the British. The French and the British later made agreement to protect the coast of France from German attack, which resulted in bringing the two nations together and act as a warning to Germany.

[26] Ibid. p.500

[27] Boer War or the South African war 1899-1902 and the Russo Japanese war 1904-1905

[28] The Clearing Hospital provided the capability to remove and evacuate casualties from the field much more quickly.

[29] Brigadier-General J. Edmonds Military Operations France and Belgium 1914 p.6-8

[30] Ibid. p.9

[31] Sir Julian S. Corbett Naval Operations History of the Great War based on Official Documents 1938 p.19

[32] R.C.K. Ensor England 1870-1914 p.412-413

[33] Gerard DeGroot Blighty-British Society in the era of the Great War (1^st Ed. 1996) p.29

[34] Sir Julian Corbett Naval Operations. History of the Great War based on Official Documents p.2-19

[35] History of the Ministry of Munitions Vol 1 p.11-12

[36] Donald Cowie An Empire Prepared (1^st Ed.1939) p.44-45

[37] Ibid. p.48[38] J.F. Bradford  Article: Railway Notes on the Manoeuvres in the eastern Counties Autumn 1912