Were tanks important to the British military success in the ‘Hundred Days’?

New weapons such as the Tank or Aeroplane did not win the war in their own right, but each when working together with the Infantry and Artillery would help and prove to be the deciding factors of the war. Understanding the impact of new and improved technologies can explain how the Allies eventually won the war. To single out tanks and assess their usefulness for the war effort might ultimately display a general lack of overall vision of importance. There was a significant learning curve involved. Human losses of the Tank Corps and of tanks themselves were prohibitive, but it is also suggested that when tanks were used they could also save lives. Some statistical evidence exists to suggest this. The tanks were subject to breakdown, overheating, poor design, and not being able to withstand a direct enemy hit, but equally, they were generally misunderstood and handled by commanders who had little or no experience in how to use them or to know what tanks were actually capable of doing. This helped push them away from the war winning weapon that they might have been. They may not have been the decisive factor in the run to victory, but they were used more during the hundred days than at any other time during the war. Good and important work was achieved by them, but tanks were never available in sufficient numbers until other arms such as artillery or aircraft were achieving their own final goals in the run to the Armistice. Their importance is without doubt, but they would not prove to be the war winning weapon. Many commanders thought they could do without them.

David Lloyd George when speaking of Tanks in his memoirs suggested the tank was the ultimate British reply to the machine gun and that there was no doubt whatever that it played a very important part in helping the Allies to victory. Lloyd George had in 1936 recognised, with some considerable hindsight, that had it not been down to the ‘stupid handling‘ of insufficient numbers of tanks on the Somme in 1916, the usage of inappropriate ground conditions at Passchendaele and the failure to exploit their initial gains at Cambrai in 1917, the Germans might have realised the worth of the tank and produced some themselves. This inadvertently presented the Allies with what turned out to be an excellent psychological weapon in their favour. Lloyd George appears to have made only brief mention of artillery which, arguably, was the most important aspect in the last six months of 1918.

The tank had an influential following. Major Clough Williams-Ellis, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell-Hart saw the tank as a revolutionary new weapon. Winston Churchill was said to be obsessed by them. It was Churchill that gave initial representations to Haig. Without his intervention, there would have been none for the war, and whilst not the inventor he can be seen as the custodian of its evolution and development.  For the future, not achieved in 1918, the vision for 1919 was for masses of tanks along all fronts. Tanks would be produced in their thousands. For 1918, Tim Travers notes comments from John Terraine, ‘It is clear that both mechanically and humanly, the tank of 1918 was not a war-winning weapon. Travers gives a reasonable and accurate account of the inadequacies of the tank, but accepts that had they been handled properly and in sufficient numbers, the situation might have been different, even becoming the final weapon to sweep the Allies to victory. The view is not dissimilar to that of Lloyd George. 

Three key questions arise. Why not make a decisive sweep of available tanks on a wider front for a more successful outcome, as was eventually envisaged for 1919? Secondly, could deliveries of tanks be reliable in the sense of meeting the constraints of military battle planning? And thirdly, despite advances in technology and engineering, why were tanks still imperfect and slow? 

One of the reasons for not allowing a major tank battle in the hundred days was that they were still recognised as very unreliable machines. In August 1918 tanks had reached Mark V in their evolution. In engineering and technical terms the design and capability of the Mark V had improved tremendously over previous versions. Epi-cyclic gearing allowing one person instead of two to control the steering, more substantial metal plating for protection and the positioning of fuel tanks externally to reduce noxious substances and so on, did much to make the tank crew’s situation more bearable, but in practice, the crew could still not go beyond an eight hour duty. Some crews that had been in action for two or three days found they could barely go beyond three hours without being physically ill. Ventilation was still an issue. Performance of the tank was questionable too. The Mark V had a greater speed and turning power, but a top speed of not much more than walking pace was still not satisfactory. 

The delivery of tanks to the battlefield depended on a variety of factors. The issue of how and when they were ordered, the efficiencies of the production line at home, how they would supply to the field and how long it would take and whether there were sufficiently trained men to receive them in France. These factors influenced Haig’s decision- making processes in how he used them. In 1917, Haig was aware of the limited experience of men with the later models, but this didn’t prevent him from ordering more tanks in greater quantities. He required eighteen battalions to be equipped, nine heavy and nine medium versions with a lead-time and delivery of only six months. For all the enthusiasm in Haig’s mind, his priorities were that tanks would be secondary to aircraft, road transport and guns.

The reasons why tanks were imperfect and slow can be based on simple evolution. It was a new weapon. The principal of caterpillar traffic had been muted some years before, but only in the desperation of war had the idea been taken up. In the beginning, the tank had not had an easy life. The War Office, as Lloyd George had often hinted, was less than enthusiastic, and so were many others, even Kitchener is reported to have referred to the tank only as ‘a pretty mechanical toy’. By 1918, when tanks were being manufactured by much improved production processes the numbers of deliveries and orders had increased. The Americans too could be relied upon to supply in greater numbers. What a year 1919 might have been. 

Churchill’s substantial belief and effort in tanks had increased the strength of the Tank Corps by 27 per cent in the six month lead up to 1 August 1918. Increases in the Machine Gun Corps and of Aircraft in France had also reached around 40 per cent each.  Commencing a battle with insufficient numbers of tanks as reputedly happened at Flers, or the expectancy of running tanks over poor ground conditions as happened at Passchendaele in the third battle of Ypres, or even the lack of exploitative gains at Cambrai, was not going to happen again. The wastage of tanks to October 1918 had been five times more than expected and stocks of spares dangerously depleted. 

Many writers have described Douglas Haig as being opposed to new technology and lacking the foresight to realise that wars must be won by weapons other than with his beloved cavalry. Haig was undoubtedly traditional as Travers tends to suggest, but Haig was very receptive to new ideas, and in the early phases of tank design sent his representative General Hugh Elles to Hatfield Park to watch and report the trials.  Other notables in attendance included Lord Kitchener, Sir William Robertson and David Lloyd George. Elles provided a report to Haig which would lead instantly to the procurement of an order of 150 tanks. The inadequacy of the eventual early designs has been mentioned, but Haig undeterred, envisaged greater use and further orders were encouraged throughout 1917 and 1918. Haig knew that surprise was a key factor and tanks, as had been shown at Cambrai, were more than capable in achieving this. Preliminary bombardments, which served only to awaken enemy interest, became a discarded activity.

Ordering high quantities of tanks indicates the army’s faith in these machines, By 1 March 1918, 700 Mark V, 600 medium, 450 supply and 48 gun-carrying tanks were on order.  The Mechanical Warfare Supply Department could produce only 200 Mark V, 250 medium and 48 gun-carrying tanks, while supply tanks could not be provided at all. Problems with co-ordination of users and makers and incomplete designs hindered development. This must have been worrying to the Commander in Chief. Close to the ‘hundred days’ Mark IV tanks had been unreliable, and whilst there were restrictions on new build, refurbished and amended units continued. Designs for Mark V’s designs could not be finalised. Prospects of agreements to a Mark VI were still too distant.

The Army had 800 Mark V’s on order for delivery at the end of May. The Germans realising that tanks could, on a good day, traverse a trench encouraged the enemy only to widen the trench. In turn, this required Britain to make longer tanks, [The Mark V Star] and this caused serious design issues for the Ministry of Munitions. 

The continued production difficulties in 1918, rendered tank supply to be far below the army requirements. The worth of the tank had been proved, particularly with Cambrai, but to rely on a machine that was in itself unreliable was becoming more than Douglas Haig was comfortable with. Haig’s faith didn’t appear to falter, but he must have realised that the uncertainty of delivery and its technology would not provide a winning combination. To make matters worse, actual output continually fell below estimates. Tank production in July 1918 was 129 and 81 in August.  In France, the number of tanks considered to be ‘fit’ fighting machines remained high, but Haig did not have enough of them.

In terms of Mark IV’s and all the variants of Mark V’s, numbers available on 30 August were 271. An adequate supply of spares would have made this figure higher still. Travers argues that the shortage of spares leans squarely on the shoulders of Colonel Albert Stern, head of the Mechanical Warfare Supply Department. Stern was more interested in numbers of tanks rather than supply of spares. 

In the early days of August the number of tanks assigned  to the V Tank Brigade and available for the Amiens offensive was 534. The brigade comprised 3 battalions, each of 3 companies of 12 fighting tanks and 2 supply tanks On the 7 August a shell struck one petrol carrying tank and exploded. Knowing that they had struck something useful, the German bombardment that followed rendered a total of 25 tanks out of action.  

The element of surprise was paramount and this was without doubt generally  achieved. General Ludendorff of the German High Command in his communiqué of 4 August 1918 stated ‘It is to the tanks that the enemy owes his success of the first day’. Ludendorff later described the first day of the battle of Amiens as being the blackest day for the German Army. Edmonds in his Official History claims that 430 tanks went into action on that first day. 

The presence of the Mark V during ‘the hundred days’, encouraged the Germans to think seriously about tanks. Bond and Cave suggest that knowing tanks were vulnerable to ‘direct hits’ the Germans would apply more artillery. Tanks were used more in the last three months of the war than at any other time but they were not actually used in any mass battle. This has often been a criticism of Haig and a reason to imply that he didn’t like them. This was not the case, but there were situations when they were inadequately used. This is not the same as being under-utilized. With casualties being as they were, tanks were given ample opportunity to show their worth. The Whippet, the medium sized tank, was faster and more manouverable, and subject to marginally less numbers of ‘direct enemy hits’, but production levels were never sufficient for any mass exercise. To be used in the same way as the heavier tanks was not practical. Being notably faster, around 8 miles per hour, infantry and artillery basically had the problem of keeping up with them.

The Official History notes that from a strategic point of view, the offensive at Amiens on 8 August 1918 was made at the wrong place. The part of the German Army that was most capable at that point just happened to be holding that part of the front. Edmonds also states that when the Germans were on the run on 8 August ‘they were not kept on it; they recovered themselves. Neglecting exploitation of gains was the problem again. The Tank Corps had been comprised of Engineers. They were not infantry nor artillery, but highly trained specialists who had a more important role than before. The emphasis was now moving from manpower to firepower. 

In August 1918, Douglas Haig’s fifty nine divisions were set to fight twice as many German Divisions as a counter attack to the Spring Offensives and this would turn out to be the start of the war’s closing phase. Viewed by many to be the outstanding Allied success of the whole war, the commencement of the Battle of Amiens on 8 August started with nearly 500 Tanks, and 800 aircraft.  Tanks despite significant design changes remained imperfect and slow. They were still subject to break down and were easily knocked out by the enemy. Haig’s decision to keep them in small groups to provide support for the Infantry was useful and in many instances they did good work, but they never brought any decisive results. The Tank Corps, not unexpectedly, didn’t entirely appreciate the value of small unit activity and advocated mass employment.  Haig had faith in Tanks. He did, after all, order 150 of them in 1916 based on a report by General Elles [his representative at Hatfield Park]. He wanted to use them in any way that would give him the breakthrough that he so eagerly wanted. As the ‘breakthrough’ that he envisaged became more and more distant in 1918, he was right not to totally rely on them. 

Travers suggests that Haig had a negative attitude towards tanks. This doesn’t appear to be the case either. Haig certainly prioritised them, but he carefully considered their importance too. Haig needed persuasion to understand General Fuller’s plans for Cambrai in the previous year, but this does not represent ‘negativity’ as Travers suggests.  GHQ it appears, were the   stumbling block in terms of accepting the tank as a weapon, and was severely lacking in the understanding of what tanks were actually capable of achieving. The regrets by Edmonds, of no planned or actual mass tank attack after Amiens, might only reflect his hindsight rather than Haig’s negativity. Haig knew that a tank attack in large numbers would give a distinct advantage. The placement of large orders with his imposed minimal lead-times, make this plain enough. The idea that tanks themselves needed support seems to have been the point many levels of High Command were oblivious to. 

As Travers suggests, tanks were not being supported, and were simply wasted. Small pockets of tanks within various brigades also appeared to be a worthless exercise. Not because of insufficient numbers, though this was certainly the case in some circumstances, but the fact that some commanders hadn’t realised how to utilise them properly. Travers gives a not unreasonable account of a Canadian Brigade with three tanks of probably Mark IV calibre, that were asked to complete tasks that were specifically beyond their capability. The commander does not appear to have realised that three may have been sufficient for the task if other factions such as infantry and artillery had given support. It seems he dismissed tanks out of hand. Commanders in other arms appear to have been less than familiar too. Travers notes that infantry commanders for instance didn’t know that tanks could be used two days together, or didn’t need to be used simply because they were there. Using more tanks than was necessary doesn’t appear to have occurred to them either. Casualties were heavy, but not much thought seems to have been given to this fact. Infantry thought they could manage without them.

During the Amiens offensive, each day saw reduced numbers of tanks employed out of action for varied reasons. By day four, few were available and these were used by the Australians, but shortly after all were withdrawn for refit. Mitchell claims no fewer than 688 machines had been in action and 480 had to be handed over to salvage. The remainder required complete overhaul. Travers quotes from Bidwell and Graham that 425 had started on the 8 August, 145 on 9 August,  85 on the third day, 38 on the fourth and 6 on the fifth.   Edmonds gives figures of 582 tanks handed over to salvage between 8 August and 27 September of which only 14 were beyond repair. Mitchell states that ‘Hardly had the tanks been withdrawn from Amiens than they were called on to fight farther north’ Not much time being allowed for repairs at this point, and leaving depleted numbers of tanks for any subsequent action around Amiens, this should have made the need for tank reserves seem obvious. The fact that reserves were generally not available was arguably overshadowed by the overall success of the Amiens battle. 

The Battle of Bapaume commenced on 21 August. Despite heavy artillery action by the Germans, they were intimidated sufficiently by the 196 tanks available and surrendered in large numbers. Infantry casualties for the BEF were few. There is overwhelming evidence to support the theory that tanks, well supported, can achieve impressive results. There is evidence too that tanks, when used in large numbers, can save infantry lives. [Tanks thinly spread during the Spring Offensives had been of little use in this respect and served to engender misunderstanding]

After Amiens and Bapaume, the tanks and crews were briefly rested. It was now becoming clear that numbers of both tanks and crews were dwindling. Mitchell records that the War Office had now at last seen the need and requirement of reserves of tanks and men but it was basically too late. The war would soon be over. The infantry had come to realise that tanks performing such tasks as wire-cutting and clearing machine gun nests was actually saving Allied lives. 

The philosophy of the tank had survived. They were not to become extinct. They had ‘revolutionized the art of warfare’.  Mitchell suggested that infantry clamoured for tanks. The Canadians, as did the crack divisions such as the Guards refused to attack unless tanks led the way. Despite their battle weariness, the tank men would not let the infantry down. The Allied Commander General Foch had been a believer in tanks. Learning from the tactics of Cambrai his mid summer surprise battles had been a complete success. Soissons in July 1918 had proved to be a resounding success having brought in the element of surprise. Foch advised the Allied command that aviation and tanks should receive the greatest development possible.

German recognition and development in tanks was even slower than the Allies. Ludendorff was not impressed with their usage in 1916-17. Continual breakdown and vulnerability was enough to hold off serious German development. When Ludendorff changed his mind after August 1918, it was already too late for the Germans. Their first encounter in the field in April 1918 at Villers-Brettoneux succeeded in pushing the British and Australians back temporarily. Monash, the Australian Commander, a believer in technology, effectively used tanks instead of infantry to clear the way at Le Hemel in July 1918. Tanks were now receiving some of the support they deserved. By November 1918 Britain had over 2500 tanks, the French had nearly 4000 but the Germans only 20. The importance of tanks for the enemy was realised too late. Using French designs the Americans and Italy would manufacture nominal numbers also. Earlier design problems had been resolved and the machines had become more efficient.  

Aircraft squadrons were in active support. The Germans had not defended in continuous trench lines as had previously been the case, they opted more for defence in depth with support of machine guns and artillery. As close to the open warfare style that it had been, the Allies found that their artillery could not respond to their needs.     

The Official History records many examples of the tank battalion giving support to different divisions, and is keen to note of their successes and failures in action. The emphasis is really based around tanks being in support in small ways and not being in any significant role. The continuous mention of tanks arriving late, developing mechanical problems and being easily knocked out, that Edmonds himself didn’t view tanks highly. The involvement of the Air Force didn’t seem to be an attractive feature either. His view was that the aerial bombing of railway junctions etc., were really without important results, and would have been more suited to reconnaissance work   This hints at a false reading. The greatest technological advancements were the tank and the aeroplane. Having an understanding of them and also of artillery and better understood infantry tactics, can give an explicit view of how the Allies managed to win the war. Tanks and other armoured vehicles used over the ‘hundred days’ numbered 1,993 of which 887 were disabled and handed over to salvage. All except 15 were repaired. Mitchell states convincingly that for the Germans at least, the Tank Corps colours were the real symbol of defeat. Casualties of the Tank Corps between 8 August and 27 September were 408 officers and 1,759 other ranks. [In this period 582 tanks were handed over to salvage]. 

America’s entrance to the war did much to enhance the reputation and potential of the tank with huge numbers being ordered. The French too had placed a great emphasis on tank production. The French designs were very popular, being used by both American and Italian manufacturers. British soldiers in late 1918 were diverted to work in tank production. The importance of the tank is perhaps laid more with the home front during the final phase.

Most historians realistically accept that tanks did not win the war. For the first time though, the ability to cross trenches, mow down barbed wire, clear and attack machine gun nests and generally engender destruction of heavily fortified trench systems was at last achievable in shortened time. To this juncture, infantry would take weeks. Tanks could usually be brought to action in minimal time, [though not necessarily on time] and without the need for a preliminary bombardment. Mitchell argues that this change in tactics might have shortened the war by at least a couple of months. It is difficult to quantify, but if Mitchell was right, any number of lives will have been saved. The Germans were faced with overwhelming numbers of infantry during the Somme battles of 1916 and failed to make a breakthrough, but the Allies managed to defeat the enemy in 1918 with almost half the number of infantry. Mitchell attributes this to the use of tanks, convincingly suggesting that ‘the 10,000 fighting men of the Tank Corps were easily worth an extra dozen divisions to the British Army’. 

Germany collapsed suddenly in the final weeks. Nobody appeared to recognize its demise, despite their visible efforts to capitulate. Some Allied commander’s had expected the war to go on into 1919, even into 1920. What the Allied higher command hadn’t recognized was that all their improvements, expertise and technology had actually revealed the outcome of the war . Tanks were important, they had presented a new era in warfare. A new weapon to replace many life threatening elements of an infantryman’s lot.  It was the tank’s potential that was only realized slowly, and this made them relatively unimportant to the overall success of the Allied effort. The German Staff had similarly ignored their importance, but after the opening days of the Battle of Amiens had come to accept that tanks were an important instrument in their enemy arsenal. The British GHQ, after having mass produced the first tank, and having been keen to abolish tanks due to their reliability issues etc., had now got tanks in great numbers on the battlefield. Germany at this point, had neither the time nor the resources to rectify their mistake.  

Beyond the final hundred days of the war, the existing tanks were becoming obsolete and new lighter models came into being. As with most military and naval budgets, the end of the war would see further moves in financial restraint to reduce the Tank Corps. Unlike the Germans, the British saw little need of tanks for the future and further development was slow. The importance of the tank does not appear to have been a lesson learned in the British mind until the coming of the Second World War.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Lloyd George D. War Memoirs of David Lloyd George (1935) Pg 381

² Ibid Pg389

³ Broad L. Winston Churchill (1956) Pg 161

⁴ The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions The Supply of Munitions (Reprint 2008)Vol XII Part III Chapter I Pg 29

⁵ Travers T                                                                                          

⁶ The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions The Supply of Munitions (Reprint 2008)Vol XII Part III Chapter I Pg 52

⁷ This was later denied suggesting that Kitchener had wanted to play it down in the interests of national security. He was actually quite impressed at the tank demonstrations at Hatfield Park in February 1916

⁸ Lloyd George D. War Memoirs of David Lloyd George  (1936) Pg 1877

⁹ The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions The Supply of Munitions (Reprint 2008)Vol XII Pt III Pg56

Enthusiasm for tanks improved after Cambrai. Costs of shell fired at Cambrai was £6.6m for captured area of 42 square miles. Passchendaele had achieved £84m for 54 square miles. 

¹0 The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions The Supply of Munitions (Reprint 2008) Vol XII Pt III Pg 69

¹1 The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions The Supply of Munitions (Reprint 2008)Vol XII Pt III  Pg 53

¹2 Ibid Pg 54

¹3 Travers T.   Could the Tanks of 1918 have been War Winners for the British Expeditionary Force (1992) Pg 393

¹4 Ibid Pg 394

¹5 Ibid Pg 394

¹6 Edmonds J. Official History of the War Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume 4 (Reprint 1993) Pg 24

¹7 Ibid Pg 25

¹8 Ibid Pg 38

¹9 Edmonds J Official History of the War Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume 4 (Reprint 1993) Pg 31

²0 Haig A Re-Appraisal Bond and Cave Pg 152-153

²1 Ibid Pg 153

²2 Edmonds J Official History of the War Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume 4 (Reprint 1993Pg 510

²3  Edmonds J. Official History of the War Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume 4 (Reprint 1993) Pg 514

²4 Travers T.   Could the Tanks of 1918 have been War Winners for the British Expeditionary Force (1992) Pg 397

²5 Ibid Pg398

²6 Ibid Pg 398

²7 Tank Warfare. The story of the Tanks in the Great War. F Mitchell MC Pg 257

²8 Travers T.   Could the Tanks of 1918 have been War Winners for the British Expeditionary Force (1992) Pg 391

²9  Edmonds J.  Official History of the War Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume 4 (Reprint 1993) pg 517

³0 Tank Warfare. The story of the Tanks in the Great War. F Mitchell MC Pg 262

³1 Tank Warfare. The story of the Tanks in the Great War. F Mitchell MC Pg 262

³2 Mitchell F. Tank Warfare. The story of the Tanks in the Great War. (orig.1935) N & P Reprint 2007)Pg 267

³3 Ibid Pg 283

³4 Ibid Pg283

³5 Ibid Pg284

³6 Edmonds J Official History of the War Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume 4 (Reprint 1993) Pg 577

³7 Mitchell F. Tank Warfare. The story of the Tanks in the Great War. (orig.1935) N & P Reprint 2007) Pg 271

³8 Ibid Pg 272

³9  Edmonds J  Official History of the War Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume 4 (Reprint 1993) Pg 517 Only 14 were struck off as irrepairable.

⁴0 Mitchell F. Tank Warfare. The story of the Tanks in the Great War. (orig.1935) N & P Reprint 2007) Pg 282

⁴1 Ibid Pg 284

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bond and Cave Haig: A Re-Appraisal 70 Years On (1999) Leo Cooper 

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Hammerton J.A. A Popular History of the Great War Volume 5 The Year of Victory 1918 The Fleetway House London

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